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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the

Plaintiff/Appellant/

Petitioner, Bonnie Kay Harris, and the Def endant/Appe nil

II
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IIIIIIK II I -H1)

Gutierrez Spivey, aka Theresa Spivey.
efendantf

i i 1 ho trial court case were Utah

Retirement Systems and the Estate of Glendon G. Spivey, deceased•
Neither of those defendants submitted anything
proceedings.

In

il :-"i

TTi : li it: n : " / ' il :.

the trial court

i ' n ppeals

proceedings

Retirement Systems submitted a Stipulation signed by all parties
named in the trial court case and an order was signed by the Utah
Court of Appeals on 2:1 February,

pi'iti

Retirement Systems from the appeal.
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REFERENCES TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed an unpublished Memorandum
Decision dated October 24, 1996. A copy is attached as Exhibit 1.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over a Utah
Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-22(3)(a)

(1995). Under

discretion

section

78-2-(5),

the Court

has "sole

in granting or denying this petition for writ of

certiorari.
There has been no cross-petition for certiorari been
filed.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
The issues presented by this Petition for Writ of Certiorari
are as follows:
1.

Does this case involve special and important reasons

justifying the granting of certiorari under Rule 46 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure?
2.

Can Petitioner now cite and raise a new issue and an old

case, Enalert v. Enalert, 576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978) which was
never raised in petitioner's briefs in her appeal at the Utah Court
of Appeals?
3.
1980,

Did the Court of Appeals decision err in holding that in

when

Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner,

Bonnie

Harris

and

Glendon 6. Spivey (now deceased) divorced retirement benefits were
not recognized as divisible marital property?
1

4.

Did the Court of Appeals err in Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.

2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), Throclcmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P. 2d
121 (Utah App. 1988), and in the present case in holding that
pension and retirement benefits would only be granted a spouse in
a divorce decree issued after the holding in Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 1982)?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P. 2d 713 (Utah App. 1990)
Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988)
Woodward vs. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)
Statutes:
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-2(3)(a)
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-(5)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(j)
Rule 46
Rule 49(a)(9)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
In 1995, 15 years after a divorce and three months after the
death of the husband (Glendon 6. Spivey), the ex-wife (AppellantPlaintiff /Petitioner, Bonnie Harris) filed a petition in a separate
case (not the divorce case) seeking to modify the property division
in the divorce and obtain retirement benefits of the deceased exhusband (Glendon G. Spivey)•

2

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Bonnie Harris and Glendon G. Spivey were divorced May 15, 1980
in case no. 53,269, Fourth District Court, State of Utah.
Glendon G. Spivey died December 27, 1994.
On March 31, 1995, Petitioner, Bonnie Harris

(Plaintiff/

Appellant), filed a petition in the Fourth Judicial District in a
new case

(#954400677-not the divorce case) seeking to obtain

retirement funds of Glendon G. Spivey
The

deceased

husband's widow,

Theresa

Gutierrez

Spivey,

(Defendant/Appellee/Respondent), filed a motion to dismiss the
petition of the ex-wife (Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner) to modify
divorce decree entered 15 years previously.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds
of (i) laches, (ii) res judicata (Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,
supra), and Ostler v. Ostler, supra), and (iii) that a divorce
decree cannot be modified in an action brought after the death of
one of the spouses.
The

ex-wife, Bonnie

Harris, appealed

the

trial

court's

dismissal ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals which affirmed the
trial court's order of dismissal on the basis of court decisions in
Ostler v. Ostler, supra, and Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra.
The Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision dated October 24,
1996, stated "Having determined that the decision can be affirmed
on the basis of the foregoing authority, we do no reach the other
bases relied upon by the trial court.11

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
decedent)

Glendon G. Spivey (sometimes hereafter referred to as
and

Plaintiff-Bonnie

Harris

were

married

May

5,

1962.(R.6#8.)
2.

Plaintiff-Harris and decedent were divorced May 15, 1980,

in case no. 53,289, District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
The decree of divorce was granted after a trial in which both
plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey were represented by counsel.
Plaintiff was represented by Brent D. Young, Attorney. (R.1,2,3,6.)
Decedent was represented by attorney Thomas Taylor. (R.22.)
3.

Financial Declarations were filed in the original divorce

action by Plaintiff (R.27-24.), and Glendon G. Spivey. (R. 24-22.)
4.

The divorce decree entered May 15, 1980, is silent as to

any distribution of retirement funds or 401k or 457 plans as to
both parties. (R.3.)
5•

Subsequent to the divorce Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris married

Craig J. Harris on November 7, 1982. (R.45.) Glendon G. Spivey (now
deceased) married Defendant- Theresa Gutierrez on November 27,
1982.(R.45.)
6.

A son, Wade, was born to Glendon Spivey and Defendant-

Theresa G. Spivey on May 7, 1985. (R.45.)
7.

During the marriage between plaintiff and Glendon G.

Spivey the plaintiff-Bonnie Harris worked for Signet ics. Glendon G.
Spivey worked for Provo City. (R.45 #2 and 3.)
8.

According to the records of the Utah State Retirement

Office, Glendon G. Spivey retired October 16, 1991, as an employee

4

of the City of Provo. (R.39,40,41,44.)
9.

In

1990

and

1991,

Glendon

G.

Spivey

changed

the

beneficiaries on his retirement and 4OIK retirement plan naming his
widow, Theresa Spivey as beneficiary in accord with statute.(R.3942.)
10.

Glendon G. Spivey died on December 27, 1994, leaving as

his surviving widow, Theresa Spivey (Appellee-Defendant), his wife
of 12 years,
the

and their son, Wade, then nine years of age who are

beneficiaries

of

his

retirement

benefit

and

his

401K

plan.(R.44 #9,and 39,40,41,44.)

11.

Defendant-Spivey and her son Wade Spivey are dependent on

the monthly income received as beneficiaries of decedent-Glendon G.
Spivey's retirement pension and 401K plan to meet current and
future health, welfare, education and living expenses, and will be
seriously adversely affected should the pension and 401K plan be
reduced or eliminated. (R.44 #13.)
12.

On March 31, 1995, fifteen years after the divorce

between Plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey, and three months after
Glendonvs death, Plaintiff filed this separate action, case no.
954400677DA, seeking to modify the divorce decree dated May 15,
1980, in case no. 53,289. (R.7.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE ANY

ISSUE MEETING

THE

CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULES 46 and 49(a)(9) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Petitioner does not cite which provision under Rule 46, Utah
5

Rules of Appellate Procedure that she is relying on, but presumably
it is Rule 46(a)(2)
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states in part
as follows:
"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons. The following, while neither
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be
considered.
•••(a)(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of the Supreme Court;11
Rule

49(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure

reequires a petition for writ of certiorari to state:
•••(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and
concise argument explaining the special and important reasons
as provided in Rule 46 for the issuance of the writ.
Petitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of Rules
46 and 49(a)(9)• There are no statements in the petition fulfilling
the requirements of the rules. Petitioner does not raise any issue
meeting the requirement for certiorari.
What we have is a disgruntled litigant seeking to reverse an
unfavorable decision.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON

A CLAIM OF ERROR WHEN THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CITE OR MAKE SUCH
ARGUMENT TO THE COURT OF APPEAL.
Petitioner never cited nor raised any question concerning
Enalert v. Enalert. 576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978), in either her
appellate brief or her reply brief in the Utah Court of Appeals.
Petitioner now attempts to raise a new issue and case for the
6

first time.
Rule 24 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
"(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When
pertinent and significant authorities come to the
attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed
in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference
either to the page of the brief or to a point argued
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter
shall without argument state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within
7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited."
(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner cannot meet the requirements of Rule 24 (j) since
she already was aware of Enalert v. Enalert, supra, citing it in
her Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at the trial
court level and failed to argue it in her Brief on Appeal.
Rule 24 (j) states the citation of additional authorities must
be done before a decision is rendered. This was not done in this
case. The Utah Court of Appeals decision was issued October 24,
1996. It is too late for petitioner to raise a new issue and case.
III. DESPITE THE FAILURE TO GIVE A BASIS FOR THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT
OF APPEALS DECISION WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT PENSION AND
RETIREMENT

BENEFITS WERE NOT RECOGNIZED AS DIVISIBLE MARITAL

PROPERTY UNTIL WOODWARD V. WOODWARD. SUPRA, WAS DECIDED IN 1982.
This court held in Bennett v. Bennett. 607 P. 2d 839 (Utah
1980) that the husband's retirement fund had no present value and
could not be divided.
7

It was not until Bennett v, Bennett, supra, was over ruled in
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 (Utah 1982), that the Supreme
Court

clearly

stated

that

retirement

and

pension

rights of

divorcing parties were subject to being divided in a divorce
action.
The Utah Court of Appeals was correct in its holding.
IV.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN OSTLER V.

OSTLER, SUPRA, AND THROCKMORTON V. THROCKMORTON, SUPRA, WHEN IT
STATED THAT PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS SHOULD ONLY BE DIVIDED
IN POST WOODWARD V. WOODWARD, supra DIVORCE CASES.
The Court of Appeals stated at pages 123-124 in Throckmorton
v. Throckmorton,supra:
•••"We must determine whether the subsequent legal
recognition of retirement benefits as marital property
subject to distribution
in a divorce case is a
substantial change of circumstances, thereby precluding
the application of res judicata. Or more specifically,
whether Woodward should be given retroactive effect.11
The Utah Court of Appeals in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,
supra, then discussed the Arizona Court of Appeals decision in
Guffev v. LaChance, 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P. 2d 634 (Ct. App. 1980).
Guffey

which involved a wife seeking to modify a seven-and-one-

half year-old divorce decree in order to share in her former
husband's military retirement benefits. The divorce decree was
silent

regarding

his pension. The Utah Court

of Appeals

in

Throckmorton at page 124 quotes the Arizona court as follows:
" (t) here is a compelling policy interest favoring the
finality of property settlements" and this policy would
be "greatly undermined if the court were to allow the
potential for reexamination of every military divorce
prior to the enactment of the rule." Id. 618 P. 2d at
8

636.
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

continued

at

page

124

in

Throckmorton stating:
"We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find
that legal recognition of a new category of property
rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior
property division. Thus, we hold that the legal
principles articulated in Woodward, should only be given
prospective application.11
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra , brought stability in the
courts as well as recognizing the divisibility of retirement and
pension assets as set forth in Woodward v. Woodward.

supra.

Otherwise the courts could be flooded with petitions to modify
prior divorce decree property divisions made years ago.
Woodward v. Woodward, supra was decided in 1982, and is
directly applicable to this case where the Spivey divorce was
entered in 1980, two years prior to Woodward.
The holding

in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton,

supra, was

reiterated in 1990, by the Court of Appeals in Ostler v. Ostler,
supra. Those decisions deal with finality of decisions involving
the division of property and are also in keeping with the Court of
Appeals' earlier decision in Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah
App. 1988).
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari doe not raise any issue
meeting the criteria for certiorari. Petitioner has failed to met
her burden under the provisions of Rules 24(j), 46, and 49 (a) (9),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
9

Enalert v. Enalert, supra was never raised to the Court of
Appeals and the time to do so has passed under Rule 24 (j), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Court of Appeals did not err
in concluding that Woodward v. Woodward, supra, first recognized
that retirement and pension rights could be divided and that a
division of retirement and pension rights would only be made in
divorce cases decided after Woodward v. Woodward, supra.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Respondent-Theresa Spivey
respectfully requests this Court to deny the petition for writ of
certiorari.
DATED this 21st day of January, 1997.

j
M. DAYLE JEFFS /f //
Attorney for D^fen/ant/
Respondent-Theresa 6. Spivey

VERNON L. SNOW
Attorney for Defendant/
Respondent-Theresa 6. Spivey

10

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original and ten copies of Theresa
Gutierrez Spivey's Response in Opposition to the Petition For Writ
of Certiorari of Defendant/Appellee/Respondent, was delivered to
the Utah Supreme Court, Room 332, Utah State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, and t! at two copies were delivered to Sidney
S. Gilbert, Personal Representative of the Estate of Glendon G.
Spivey, deceased, at the ad iress set forth below, and two copies
were mailed to Charles A. S hultz, attorney for the Petitioner,by
placing the same in the Uni ed States mail, postage prepaid, this
JLzf

day of January, 1997, addressed as follows:

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
Attorney at Law
P.O. BOX 5526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
(Mailed)
SIDNEY S. GILBERT, C.P.A.
190 West 800 North
Provo, Utah 84601
(Delivered)
VERNON L. SNO*
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BONNIE HARRIS V. THERESA GUTIERREZ SPIVEY
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FILED OCTOBER 24, 1996
Case NO. 950494-CA
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OCT 2 *\ 1996
COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Bonnie Harris fka Bonnie
Spivey,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-appellee,

Case No. 9 5 0494-CA

v.

Theresa Gutierrez Spivey,

F I LE U
(October 24, I ')9G)

Estate of Glendon Spivey, and
Utah Retirement Systems,
Defendants, Appellee, and
Cross-appellant.

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield
Attorneys:

Charles A. Schultz, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Vernon L. Snow and M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for
Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Jackson.
BENCH, Judge:
Bonnie Harris appeals the trial court's decision granting
defendants1 motion to dismiss her petition to modify a 1980
divorce decree. The trial court held that res judicata and
laches barred litigation of retirement benefits in question, and
that the divorce decree could not be modified in an action
brought after the death of one of the parties to the divorce (Mr.
Spivey).
In connection with the motion to dismiss, both sides
submitted affidavits and documentary evidence to the trial court.
Therefore, we treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Utah
R. Civ. P. 12. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
When Harris and Mr. Spivey divorced in 1900, retirement
benefits were not recognized as divisible marital property.

Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982] ;
Ostler. 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App. 1990). This court has
consistently held that retirement benefits can onl / be divided as
marital property in divorces entered after the Woodward decision.
Ostler, 789 P.2d at 717 (recognizing "Woodward I is to be given
prospective application only"); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767
P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988) (holding "legal principles
articulated in Woodward, should only be given prospective
application"). Because Harris was not entitled to any of Mr.
Spivey's retirement benefits at the time of the divorce, she is
not entitled to any of his retirement benefits now. Having
determined that the decision can be affirmed on the basis of the
foregoing amthority, we do not reach the other bases relied upon
by the trial court.
Theresa Spivey cross appeals for attorney fees, which were
denied by the trial court. We find no basis for reversing the
trial court's decision not to award attorney fc ^s.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.
No costs awarded.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE COJJCBR^

J4v

%/?M^

James Z. Davis 4
Ass^K/late Pre^f/ding Judge
£fc^>£—-^
Norman H. Jacksonri^Judge

950494-CA
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APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 2

BENNETT V. BENNETT
607 P.2d 839 (Utah 1980)
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BENNETT v, BENNETT

Utah

839

Cite as, Utah, 607P.2d839

3 entitled to be heard upon any
hat might affect their rights under
ee.8
Also, in this regard, it is important
that an attempt to reform a deed is
iding in equity.9 A court of equity
erally not assist one in extricating
from circumstances which he has
10
Plaintiff is solely responsible for
Hales in a position to convey the
f, she having conveyed the property
3 by warranty deed, and Hales hav>perly recorded it. Hales merely
imed to Royal Gardens any legal
he may have had in the property at
B of the conveyance.11
med. Costs to Royal Gardens.
3KETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
NS, JJ., concur.
NART, J., concurs in result.

Carles N. BENNETT, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
nna Mae BENNETT, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 16268.

appealed. In a per curiam unpublished
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, and
husband filed petition for rehearing. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that fact
that testimony and findings in case established that that portion of husband's retirement fund contributed by United States
Government had no present value, and may
not have any value in future, meant that it
was error for trial court to consider such
matter as one of assets of parties, thereby
using it as one of significant predicates in
court's determination of property division
between parties provided for in decree.
Reversed and remanded.
Crockett, C. J., dissented and filed opinion in which Stewart, J., concurred.
Divorce <s=>253(3)
In divorce action, fact that testimony
and findings in case established that that
portion of husband's retirement fund contributed by United States Government had
no present value, and may not have any
value in future, meant that it was error for
trial court to consider such matter as one of
assets of parties, thereby using it as one of
significant predicates in court's determination of property division between parties
provided for in decree. U.C.A.1953,30-3-5.
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for plaintiff and
appellant.
J. Val Roberts, Centerville, for defendant
and respondent.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 1980.

WILKINS, Justice:

i divorce action, the Second District
Davis County, Maurice J. Harding,
tered judgment from which husband

A petition for rehearing in this divorce
action was granted by this Court after its
per curiam unpublished opinion was filed on
October 19, 1979, which affirmed the action
of the District Court of Davis County.

iter Creek Water and Irrigation Co. v.
say, 21 Utah 192, 60 P. 559 (1900). See
Houser v. Smith, 19 Utah 150, 56 P. 683
?)

10. State ex rel. Burk v. Oklahoma City, Okl.,
522 P.2d 612 (1973). See also Pacific Metals
Co. v. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 21 Utah
2d 400, 446 P.2d 303 (1968)

:obsen v. Jacobsen,

11. U.C.A. 1953,57-1-13.

Utah, 557 P.2d 156
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Plaintiff and defendant were married on
May 31, 1947, and have four children as
issue of this marriage, two of whom are
emancipated. The two minor children reside with defendant, to whom care, custody,
and control were awarded on November 29,
1978, by the District Court.
The only issue we shall address here is
whether the District Court erred in considering as an asset of this marriage the
share of plaintiff's retirement fund contributed by the United States government.
The plaintiff is—and has been—employed
at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.
The Court, in its award to the defendant
of the real property of the parties, the
equity of which was $38,000, imposed a lien
of $5,000 on that property in favor of the
plaintiff, making the lien payable upon the
occurrence of one of four conditions, which
are not pertinent to this appeal.

government. And the Court in its findu
found no present value on this portu
Significantly, the Court, in determini
what an equitable amount of this h
should be, frankly acknowledged that
considered the amount of the governmen
contribution to plaintiff's retirement fui
The following dialogue occurred betwe
the Court and plaintiff's counsel:
Mr. Vlahos: Your Honor, if I understai
your Honor's position in reference
this $5,000.00 lien, it is based on son
$15,000.00 that the government h
that he can't touch, has no control ove
has never seen, rather than takii
what the parties can have right no\
The Court: Yes. That's taken into co
sideration. I want that understood, i
that in case you do want to appeal, ar
have that matter raised you can do s
In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576 Pi
1274, 1276 (1978), this Court in interpretin
Sec. 30-3-5 l stated:
It is our opinion that the correct vie^
under our law is that this encompasses a
of the assets of every nature possessed b
the parties, whenever obtained and froi
whatever source derived; and that thi
includes any such pension fund or insui
ance. These should be given due consid
eration along with all other assets, ir
come and the earnings and the potentia
earning capacity of the parties, in deter
mining what is the most practical, jus
and equitable way to serve the best inter
ests and welfare of the parties and thei
children. (Emphasis added).

The retirement officer in the Civilian
Personnel Office at Hill Air Force Base, a
Margaret S. Woods, testified that as of the
time of this divorce hearing the present
value of plaintiff's retirement fund was
$15,681.95, the amount of his total contribution. She further stated that the U. S.
government had contributed the same
amount to his retirement fund; viz., $15,681.95, and that plaintiff could withdraw
his contribution any time prior to thirty-one
days before the eligibility date for his
retirement on May 7,1984. The retirement
officer further testified, "[t]he amount of
money that he (plaintiff) has in the retirement fund does not have any bearing on
what he would get under retirement monthly annuity. The only value of what he has
in the retirement fund is for income tax
purposes or death benefit purposes." She
did not elaborate on this last, somewhat
cryptic, sentence. But, from her uncontradicted testimony, we believe no reasonable
interpretation can be placed on it other
than one that concludes no present value
can be assigned to that portion of plaintiff's
retirement fund contributed by the U. S.

Because the testimony and findings ii
this case clearly establish that that portioi
of the plaintiff's retirement fund contribut
ed by the U. S. government has no presem
value—and may not have any value in th(
future—we hold that it was error for the
District Court to consider this matter as om
of the assets of the parties, thereby using it
as one of the significant predicates in the
Court's determination of property division

1. This section reads:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the chil-

dren, property and parties, and the mamte
nance of the parties and children, as may be
equitable * * *"
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veen the parties provided for in the
*ee.
ther matters raised by plaintiff are
Tied to be without merit.
eversed and remanded for proceedings
jerning the matter of property distribubetween the parties consistent with
opinion. Affirmed in all other respects,
costs or attorney's fees are awarded.

uity or injustice as to warrant this Court's
interference therewith.
STEWART, J., concurs in the views expressed in the opinion of CROCKETT, C. J.
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[AUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
ROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting):
would adhere to our prior decision. I
in hearty agreement with the quote
m the Englert case that the court should
sider "all of the assets of every nature
sessed by the parties whenever obtained
I from whatever source derived and that
i includes such pension fund or insure d and this should include anything
t is realistic and substantial, even in
•ectancy. To demonstrate the complete
gic of plaintiff's counsel's argument that
court should not consider the pension
id because the plaintiff has never seen it
lad possession or control over it: suppose
had been determined in a probate proding that the plaintiff was to receive a
«tantial inheritance from a relative's ese, but it was not to be paid him until
apletion of the probate. Would it be
rued that because he had never seen the
ney, nor had possession or control over it,
\ court could not consider it as a part of
j total circumstances.
The trial judge was ineluctably correct in
ting that he had considered all the cirnstances, including the possibility that
i plaintiff would receive the pension reTed to.
There is a matter far more important and
ltrolling than the foregoing, quite rerdless of the statement the trial judge
ide, which has provided a basis for fur2r controversy, and for this appeal. As
Iicated in our original opinion, when this
urt surveys the circumstances of these
rties, as it may do in such cases, it is my

Laverne C. PEAY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Lynn E. PEAY, Defendant and
Appellant
No. 16314.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 21, 1980.
Husband appealed from an order of the
Fourth District Court, Utah County, David
Sam, J., denying his motion to vacate and
set aside a decree of divorce. The Supreme
Court, Hall, J., held that even if motion to
vacate and set aside divorce decree was
viable after modification had been granted,
appeal from trial court's striking of such
motion was not timely where not brought
within one month of entry of the order on
the original petition to modify or to vacate
and set aside the decree of divorce.
Appeal dismissed.
1. Pretrial Procedure <s=>693
Denial of a motion to dismiss does not
necessarily constitute a ruling on the merits
of a motion.
2. Divorce <s=»181
Even if motion to vacate and set aside
divorce decree was viable after modification
had been granted, appeal from trial court's
striking of such motion was not timely,
where not brought within one month after

APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 3

ENGLERT V. ENGLERT
576 P. 2d 1274 (Utah 1978)
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Hedwig Camacho ENGLERT, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Edwin ENGLERT, Jr., Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14978.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 23, 1978.

Former husband appealed from certain
aspects of the property division provisions
of a divorce decree entered in the District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,
J. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held
that: (1) where the parties' son was 25
years old and in absence of any showing
that he was disabled or limited in his ability
to support himself, any contribution the
husband made to his son's support was voluntary and did not diminish the amount
which the decree required him to pay his
former wife as alimony and child support
for herself and the parties' minor daughter;
(2) the trial court properly considered as a
family asset the husband's accrued retirement fund amounting to $29,717, and (3)
the husband was not legally obligated to
provide any support or maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of his 25year-old son and was obliged to do so for his
daughter only until she attained the age of
18.
Affirmed as modified.

1. Divorce <3=>308

Where divorcing parties' son was 25
years old and there was no showing that
the son was disabled or limited in his ability
to support himself, any contribution that
father made to support of the son, who was
a student, was voluntary and did not diminish the amount which divorce decree required father to pay to his former wife as
alimony and child support for herself and
the parties' 12-year-old daughter.

2. Divorce <s=>249(3)
Statute which provides for the nonassignability and exception from legal process
of insurance benefits relates only to the law
of insurance and has no effect on the equitable powers of a court, in a divorce proceeding, to deal with all assets of the parties. U.C.A.1953, 49-10-48.
3. Divorce <3=*249(3)
Statute governing the property rights
of parties in divorce matters which authorizes the court to make such orders in relation to the property "as may be equitable",
encompasses all assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived, including pension funds or insurance. U.C.A.
1953, 30-3-5.
4. Divorce <s=>249(3)
In divorce proceeding, trial court did
not err in considering as a family asset
husband's accrued retirement fund amounting to $29,717. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
5. Divorce <@=>306, 310

Divorced father was not legally obligated to provide any support or maintain
any life insurance policies for the benefit of
his son who was 25 years of age; father
was obliged to do so for his daughter only
until she attained the age of 18. U.C.A.
1953, 15-2-1.
Jimi Mitsunaga, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Harley W. Gustin and Paul H. Liapis,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice:
Defendant Edwin Englert, Jr., appeals
attacking only certain aspects of the award
and property disposition in a divorce decree.
The parties were married on September
5, 1948, and had two children: Robert, born
1952, thus now 25, and Diane, born 1965,
thus now 12.
During the 28 years of marriage the parties acquired a residence in Salt Lake City,
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Utah, valued at approximately $40,000 with
a mortgage of $7,500. They also accumulated other substantial assets consisting of
savings accounts, land in Duchesne County,
insurance policies and defendant's retirement fund through the Veterans Hospital,
where he is Chief of the Gastro-Intestinal
Section, from which he receives a gross
income of $2,002.04 per month.
The trial court appears to have made a
fair and equitable disposition of these assets
between the parties and with respect to the
alimony and support money, with the exceptions discussed below.
[1] In regard to his duty to his children,
appellant's brief states that: "He is voluntarily paying $150 to his son." As noted
above, the son Robert is now 25 years old.
Even though he is still attending Utah
State University, there is no showing that
he is disabled or limited in his ability to
support himself. Therefore any contribution defendant makes to Robert is indeed
voluntary l and does not diminish the
amount which the decree requires him to
pay the plaintiff as alimony and child support for herself and the daughter Diane.
Defendant's
principal
remonstrance
against the judgment is that the court
erred in considering as a family asset his
"accrued retirement fund
at the
Veterans
Administration
Hospital,"
amounting to $29,717. For the purpose of
getting to that main contention of the defendant, we spare the admittedly somewhat
complicated conditions the decree places
upon the disposition of this fund in an apparent effort to assure payment of the alimony and support money provided therein.
Defendant argues that his retirement fund
is not "property" within the meaning of our
statutes and should not be so considered in
determining the rights of the parties under
the divorce decree. He reasons that because that fund was accumulated as a result of his service and tenure, it is inequitable to permit the plaintiff to participate
therein. He cites" In re Marriage of EHis,
36 Colo.App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975),
1. That this is true except where a child is
mentally or physically deficient and incapable

where the Colorado Court of Appeals stated:
We hold that the husband's army
retirement pension and the future retired
pay to be received thereunder do not constitute property' and are, therefore, not
subject to division under the Colorado
statute.
He also cites Baker v. Baker, Okl., 546 P.2d
1325 (1976) to the same effect.
By way of comparison defendant states in
his brief that "Community-property states,
notably California, Idaho, New Mexico and
Oregon, have held that retirement funds
and pensions that have accrued during the
marriage are community property and subject to division between the parties upon
dissolution of the marriage." Citing e. g.
Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 118 Cal.Rptr.
621, 530 P.2d 589 (1925) and other cases.
He argues therefrom that because those
courts refer to that fact in holding that
retirement benefits are community property and thus subject to allocation between
the spouses when a marriage is dissolved,
that that indicates that it should not be so
in states, such as Utah, where the community-property status does not exist; and
urges that holdings in community-property
state cases are not controlling here and
should not become our law. Further implementing his argument, he points to U.C.A.
1953, Sec. 49-10-48 which provides for the
nonassignability and exception from legal
process of benefits under insurance.
[2] With due consideration for the plausibility of the defendant's arguments on the
grounds just stated, we cannot agree with
them. Sec. 49-10-48 relates only to the
law of insurance and can have no effect
upon the equitable powers of a court in
divorce matters to deal with all assets of
the parties.
[3,4] Our statute which governs the
property rights of the parties in divorce
matters, 30-3-5, states*
of supporting himself see Dehm v Dehm, Utah,
545 P 2d 525 (1976)
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When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable.
It is to be particularly noted that that language is in general terms and contains no
hint of limitation. The import of our decisions implementing that statute is that proceedings in regard to the family are equitable in a high degree; and that the court
may take into consideration all of the pertinent circumstances.2 It is our opinion that
the correct view under our law is that this
encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived;
and that this includes any such pension
fund or insurance. These should be given
due consideration along with all other assets, income and the earnings and the potential earning capacity of the parties, in
determining what is the most practical, just
and equitable way to serve the best interests and welfare of the parties and their
children.3
[5] Defendant's other ground of attack
is that the decree requires him to maintain
certain life insurance policies with his children as beneficiaries for a period of 15
years. On this point defendant is correct.
He is not legally obligated to provide any
such support or benefit for his son Robert
who is 25 years of age; and he is obliged to
do so for his daughter Diane only until she
attains the age of 18 years.4 It is therefore
necessary that the decree be modified accordingly.
Affirmed as modified.
bear their own costs.

The parties to

ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
2. See Pmion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d
265.

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Thomas Michael MANSFIELD,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 15375.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 28, 1978.

Defendant appealed from his conviction
in City Court of Brigham City of driving 70
miles per hour. The First District Court,
Box Elder County, VeNoy Christoffersen,
J., permitted State's amendment to complaint and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, and State appealed. The Supreme
Court, Ellett, C. J., held that: (1) complaint
on appeal from city court could not be
amended in district court, and (2) where
amended complaint filed in district court
was never signed by any complaining witness, dismissal of complaint was mandated.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law ®=*260.13
Complaint on appeal from city court
could not be amended in district court;
since district court only had derivative jurisdiction, if complaint was faulty in city
court, it remained faulty on appeal.
2. Indictment and Information <£=»162
Where defendant was convicted in city
court of driving 70 miles per hour in violation of resolution adopted by State Road
Commission, where, on appeal, district court
permitted amendment which charged that

S.L.U.1975, Ch 39, Sec. 1, it was changed to
make minority extend to 18 years for both
sexes, however it added that courts in divorce
3. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P..2d 977. actions /nay order support to age 21. See also
exception noted in Dehm v. Dehm in footnote 1
4. U.C.A.1953, Sec. 15-2-1, formerly provided
above.
that the period of minority extended in males
to 21 years and females to 18 years, but in
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and he has shown no good cause for relieving him of his waiver in this case.

Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.

Judge Rokich's dismissal of the petition
is affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and
ZIMMERMAN and STEWART, J J ,
concur.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the result.
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Margieann W. OSTLER (Wyatt), and
the State of Utah, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Raymond Floyd OSTLER, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 880172-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 20, 1990.

Former wife filed petition for modification of divorce decree. Parties stipulated
that there was a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to provide a basis for
modification of the decree. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, David S.
Young, J., modified amount of support
from $75 per month per child to $200 per
month per child, declined to distribute former husband's retirement account, but
awarded wife $250 in attorney fees. Wife
sought review. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that: (1) trial court's failure
to make specific findings on statutory
factors constituted reversible error, (2)
wife articulated no change of circumstances justifying a reevaluation of original
property division with regards to husband's
retirement account; and (3) wife was entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred
on appeal.

1. Divorce <s=*309.1
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary
changes in child support awards, taking
into account not only the needs of the children, but also the ability of the parent to
pay. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(3).
2. Divorce ®=>309.2(2)
A party seeking modification of a child
support award must show that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred
since the divorce decree, not contemplated
within the decree itself.
3. Divorce <£=>312.6(1)
Once the trial court has made a determination on modification of a child support
award, the Court of Appeals accords its
ruling substantial deference.
4. Divorce <a=>286(3, 6)
The apportionment of financial responsibility in a divorce proceeding will not be
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the Court
of Appeals determines that the trial court
has abused its discretion.
5. Divorce e=>312.6(8)
The failure of trial court to enter specific findings on each of the statutory
factors for an award of prospective support
after a material change of circumstances is
generally reversible error, particularly
where the trial court orders a party to pay
support to a child beyond the age of majority. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(2) (now (3)).
6. Divorce <s=>312.6(8)
Trial court's failure to make specific
findings as to each of the relevant statutory factors in proceeding to modify child
support, in which support was increased,
was reversible error, even though trial
court's findings noted a "dramatic" increase in husband's income and a "substantial" decline in wife's health. U.C.A.1953,
78-45-7(2) (now (3)).
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7. Divorce <e=>286(6)
Trial court's finding, on former wife's
petition for modification of divorce decree,
that former husband's retirement account
was not vested at time of decree, and that
value of account at vesting was "sufficiently nominal" such that child support payments made by husband in excess of legal
obligation more than compensated wife for
value of account, was appropriately described as a conclusion of law, and given no
particular deference on review, even
though trial court described its reasoning
as a "finding of fact."
8. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Former wife was not entitled to portion of former husband's retirement account, on former wife's petition for modification of divorce decree; wife did not receive portion in initial decree, and wife's
claim of lack of knowledge of retirement
benefits did not constitute a change of circumstances justifying reevaluation of original division.
9. Divorce <3=>288
Former wife was entitled to award of
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal of her petition for modification of divorce decree, where wife partially prevailed, and wife was in need of the assistance. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
Penny Heal Trask, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Harold R. Stephens, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Appellant appeals from an order entered
in district court modifying a decree of divorce. We affirm the order in part, vacate
the order in part, and remand.
Appellant Margieann Ostler and respondent Raymond Floyd Ostler were divorced
in 1978 after an eighteen-year marriage.
The decree of divorce awarded appellant

child support in the amount of $75 per
month for each of the four children in her
custody. The decree also provided for visitation rights, alimony, life and health insurance, attorney fees, and distribution of real
property, personal property, and debts.
There was no provision for the distribution
of respondent's retirement account.
In 1987, appellant filed a petition for
modification of the divorce decree. Although respondent had voluntarily increased the amount of his child support
payments from $75 to $110 per month per
child, appellant sought to increase child
support to $230 per month for each of the
three remaining minor children. She also
sought to distribute respondent's retirement account, and to receive her attorney
fees and costs. As a basis for modification
of the decree, appellant stated that she was
unemployed, on public assistance, and that
she was unable to obtain employment due
to a speech disability. She also alleged
that respondent had remarried and that his
income had increased substantially.
Respondent moved to dismiss the petition
on the grounds that appellant had failed to
include the State of Utah as the real party
in interest. Respondent claimed that the
State was providing appellant with financial assistance and that the State was also
assigned appellant's right to receive child
support payments. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-9(2) (1987). The court subsequently granted appellant's motion to amend her
petition to join the State of Utah as coplaintiff.
A hearing on the petition was conducted
on December 16, 1987. Counsel for the
State appeared and stated that respondent
was current in his support obligation, and
indicated that the State's interest was satisfied as long as respondent continued to
provide at least the existing level of support. Counsel was then excused.
The parties stipulated that there was a
substantial change of circumstances sufficient to provide a basis for modification of
the decree. The hearing proceeded by
proffer. The district court subsequently
issued a memorandum decision modifying
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the amount of support from $75 per month
per child to $200 per month per child. It
remains unclear whether this award was
premised on the support of three children
or two children.1 The court declined to
distribute respondent's retirement account,
but awarded appellant $250 in attorney
fees. Appellant now seeks review of the
amount of child support and the denial of
retirement benefits. She also requests an
award of attorney fees on appeal.
CHILD SUPPORT
[1-4] Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary
changes in child support awards, taking
into account "not only the needs of the
children, but also the ability of the parent
to pay." Woodward v. Woodward, 709
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam);
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989). A party seeking modification of a child support
award must show that a substantial change
of circumstances has occurred since the
divorce decree, not contemplated within the
decree itself. Woodward, 709 P.2d at 394.
Once the trial court has made a determination on modification, we accord its ruling
substantial deference. Id.; Proctor v.
Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The apportionment of financial responsibility between the parties will not be
upset on appeal unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or we determine that the court has abused its discretion. Woodward, 709 P.2d at 394; Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299
(Utah 1981); Proctor, 773 P.2d at 390;
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161
(Utah Ct.App.1989). However, an award of
child support may be "so inordinately low"
as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 73
(Utah Ct.App.1988), cert, granted, 765 P.2d
1277 (1988).

modifying the original support award from
$75 to $200 per month per child.
[5] In awarding prospective support after a material change of circumstances, the
relevant factors to be considered include:
(a) the standard of living and situation of
the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(f) the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for
the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2) (1987); Martinez, 754 P.2d at 73 n. 3. Because these
factors "constitute material issues upon
which the trial court must enter findings of
fact/' Jefferies v Jeffenes, 752 P.2d 909,
911 (Utah CtApp 1988), the failure to enter
specific findings on each of the factors is
generally reversible error, particularly
where the court orders a party to pay support to a child beyond the age of majority.
Id. at 911-12.
[6] While the trial court made findings
of fact, we cannot determine to what extent these factors were applied. The findings merely note a "dramatic" increase in
respondent's income and a "substantial"
decline in appellant's health, and set the
award at $200 per month per child. The
lack of specificity in the findings is further
compounded by the court's award of support "until each child graduates from high
school" regardless of age. We conclude
that the failure of the trial court to make
specific findings on the statutory factors
constitutes reversible error.

The parties in this case stipulated that
there had been a substantial change of
circumstances since the original decree.
The stipulation leaves for resolution whether the district court abused its discretion in

Since the case must be remanded for
entry of more specific findings, we merely
note the apparent inadequacy in the
amount of child support awarded. Statutory guidelines now establish base amounts
of child support. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.14 (Supp.1989). Although not in
effect at the time of the trial court's modification order, see Utah Code Ann.

1. One of the three minors was nearly eighteen
at the time of the modification hearing; there-

fore, only two children of the marriage are now
below the age of majority.

789P.2d—17
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§ 78-45-7.2(l)(a) (Supp.1989), these guidelines are useful in determining the adequacy of support. Appellant argues that the
disparity between the statutory guidelines
and the trial court's award constitutes an
abuse of discretion. We are not prepared
to go quite so far in the absence of specific
findings, but the financial declarations of
appellant and respondent contained in the
record indicate gross monthly incomes of
$828 and $4,372, respectively. Cf. Martinez, 754 P.2d at 73 (abuse of discretion
shown in award of $300 per month per
child, where incomes were $1,033 and
$8,333, respectively). Appellant is functionally handicapped, on welfare, and receiving food stamps. These facts connote
such a sharp contrast in living standards
between the parties that $200 per month
per child appears to be inadequate, and
thus may constitute an abuse of the court's
discretion.
"Child support awards should approximate actual need and, when possible, assure the children a standard of living comparable to that which they would have experienced if no divorce had occurred." Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). Furthermore, it is public
policy in this state that "children shall be
maintained from the resources of responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding,
at least in part, the burden often borne by
the general citizenry through welfare pro- (
grams." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45b-l.l 1
(1987). Since we must vacate the order \
and remand for entry of more specific findings, the award of support should either be
justified under these objectives, or modified
consistent with the statutory guidelines
now in effect2
RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
DISTRIBUTION
As part of appellant's petition for modification, she claimed that respondent's retirement account was undistributed at the time
of the divorce and should now be so distributed. Appellant concedes that the decree
2. The statutory guidelines may be applied to
child support orders existing prior to July 1,
1989, as long as the guidelines do not form the

makes no mention of the retirement account, but argues that she was not aware
of it at the time of the divorce. The district court refused to modify the divorce
decree to distribute the retirement account
on the grounds that it was not vested at
the time of the decree. The court also
found that the value of the account at
vesting was "sufficiently nominal" such
that child support payments made by respondent in excess of his legal obligation
more than compensated appellant for the
value of the account.
[7] Although the trial court described
its reasoning as a ''finding of fact," it is
more appropriately described as a conclusion of law. See State ex rel. Div. of
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil,
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1990) (Appellate court will disregard the label of
"findings of fact" and look to the substance.). We accord a trial court's legal
conclusions no particular deference on appeal, but review them for correctness.
IFG Leasing Co. v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607,
611 (Utah 1989). Without addressing the
correctness of the district court's rationale,
we may still affirm the result "on any
proper ground(s), despite the trial court's
having assigned another reason for its ruling." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
[8] Shortly after the district court rendered its decision, this court addressed a
similar issue in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Mrs. Throckmorton sought to modify a
1976 divorce decree, silent as to Mr.
Throckmorton's retirement benefits, to obtain one-half of those benefits. The trial
court determined that Mrs. Throckmorton
had the opportunity to litigate the issue at
the time of the divorce, and since she failed
to do so, the claim was barred under the
doctrine of res judicata.
Our opinion noted that res judicata "is
unique in divorce actions because of the
equitable doctrine which allows courts to
basis of a material change of circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(1 )(b) (Supp.1989).
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reopen alimony, support, or property distri- the attorney fees of the party in need.
butions if the moving party can demon- This discretionary authority has been held
strate a substantial change of circumstanc- to include attorney fees incurred on appeal.
es since the matter was previously con See Maughan, 770 P.2d at 162-63. Based
sidered by the court." Id. at 123. We / on appellant's financial declaration, it is
noted that pension benefits were first rec- apparent that she is in need of such assistognized as marital assets in Utah in Wood- ance. Since appellant has partially preward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah vailed, we award her attorney fees reason1982) ("Woodward F).
Throckmorton, ably incurred on appeal.
767 P.2d at 123. We then addressed the
issue whether Woodward I should be given
CONCLUSION
retroactive effect. Id. We ultimately deWe affirm the district court's order with
termined that "legal recognition of a new
respect to respondent's retirement account.
category of property rights after a divorce
The remainder of the order is vacated.
decree has been entered, is not itself suffiThe issue of child support is remanded for
cient to establish a substantial change of
the entry of specific findings and an award
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of
of child support in accordance with those
the prior property division/' Id. at 124.
findings. We also remand the case for the
In the instant case, appellant has articu- purpose of determining and awarding atlated no change of circumstance justifying torney fees and costs reasonably incurred
a reevaluation of the original property divi- by appellant on appeal.
sion. Appellant's claim of lack of knowlDAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ.,
edge of the retirement benefits does not
concur.
constitute such a change. The only other
possible change of circumstance is Woodward I's legal recognition of retirement
(O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
benefits as marital assets. However, the
decree of divorce was entered more than
four years before the issuance of Woodward I and the modification order was enLauralee CURTIS, Plaintiff
tered a year before the issuance of Throckand Appellant,
morton. Inasmuch as Woodward I is to
v.
be given prospective application only, there
William Gregory CURTIS, Defendant
is no appropriate basis on which to divide
and Respondent.
respondent's retirement account. Rather,
we find the "policy interest favoring the
No. 890210-CA.
finality of property settlements" to be comCourt of Appeals of Utah.
pelling. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124
(quoting Guffey v. LaChance, 127 Ariz.
March 27, 1990.
140, 618 P.2d 634, 636 (CtApp.1980)); see
also Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368
Former wife challenged former hus(Utah Ct.App.1988). We therefore affirm
band's failure to return children to Utah
the district court's order with respect to
from Mississippi. Former husband moved
retirement benefits.
for enforcement of Mississippi court's modification of child custody provisions of Utah
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
divorce decree. The Fourth District Court,
[9] Appellant contends she is impecuni- Utah County, Boyd L. Park, J., enforced
ous and requests attorney fees on appeal. Mississippi court's modification of custody.
Although she does not cite statute or rule Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals,
for such an award, Utah Code Ann. Orme, J., held that: (1) Mississippi court
§ 30-3-3 (1989) provides that either party lacked jurisdiction to modify child custody
to a divorce action may be ordered to pay while Utah court had continuing jurisdic-
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light most favorable to the court below,
evidence is insufficient to support the
ings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
I 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Fitzgerv. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah
ipp.1987). Appellant has wholly failed
sustain this burden. Moreover, the
rd contains ample evidence from which
trial court could conclude that Borrego
nded to disrupt the proceedings.
] Borrego's second contention is that
court was required to warn him that his
iuct was contumacious before a finding
ontempt could be made. While admitthat the court indicated that it found
anity in the courtroom extremely ofive, defendant asserts that the statet was not an effective warning because
as "made to Mr. Borrego's attorney
not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no
:tion was given to counsel to warn Mr.
•ego." The assertion is clearly without
it. The record of proceedings is suffib to establish that Borrego was made
re that his conduct was inappropriate
that he was represented by competent
lsel who was aware of proper courtn conduct. Finally, Borrego's reliance
laton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94
. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) is mised. Eaton was a per curiam decision
ing that a trial judge's finding of conpt based solely on the use of an explein response to cross-examination could
be affirmed. The decision specifically
d that the expletive was not directed
ird the court and that there was no
nation in the record of loud or boisterconduct or any attempt to prevent the
•t from carrying on its duties. The
ual situation is markedly different from
presented by the transcript of proceedin the present case.
] Borrego further contends that the
ings are insufficient in that they do not
il how the sentencing "was delayed or
aly interrupted" by his comments,
n Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987) requires
court to recite the facts as occurring
[the court's] immediate view and pres»" that support the judgment of conpt. The court in this case found, in

relevant part, that defendant "became loud
and boisterous, using profanity which tended to interrupt the due course of the sentencing hearing." In reviewing a challenge
to a trial court's factual findings, we apply
a "clearly erroneous" standard. That standard requires that "if the findings . . . are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made, the findings . . . will be set
aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987). We conclude that the findings
of the trial court are supported by the
weight of the evidence and that they adequately support the judgment of the court.
The judgment of contempt is affirmed.
GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.,
concur.
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Guido C. PORCO, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Vincenza Mangio PORCO, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860150-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 5, 1988.
Former husband brought motion seeking to terminate alimony, to secure return
of certain personal property and to recover
attorney fees. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., denied motion and ordered former husband to
pay former wife's attorney fees, and former husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) finding that
there had been no material change in parties' circumstances, as required to modify
divorce decree, was amply supported by the
record; (2) absent showing of substantive
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change in circumstances concerning distribution of property, divorce decree could not
be modified; (3) trial court's award of attorney fees was not in abuse of discretion;
and (4) former wife was entitled to costs
and attorney fees on appeal.
Affirmed and remanded.

1. Divorce <s=»164
Having failed to appeal original divorce decree, former husband, in order to
modify decree, had to show substantial
change of circumstances occurring since
entry of decree and not contemplated in
decree itself.
2. Divorce <^245(3)
Finding that there had been no material change in parties' circumstances, as required to modify divorce decree, was amply
supported by the record, which showed
that former wife still required $200 alimony award to maintain as nearly as possible
her previous standard of living and to prevent her from becoming a public charge.
3. Divorce <3=»254(2), 255
Absent showing of substantive change
in circumstances concerning distribution of
property, divorce decree could not be modified and matters previously litigated and
incorporated therein could not be collaterally attacked in face of doctrine of res judicata.
4. Divorce <3=>254(2)
Trial court's alleged failure to award
husband other property in wife's possession, which he originally purchased, was
not a changed circumstance as would support modification of divorce decree.
5. Divorce <®=>254(1)
Radial arm saw was not a "hand tool"
under terms of divorce decree.
6. Divorce <3=>227(1)
In divorce action, award of attorney
fees must be supported by the evidence
that amount awarded was reasonable and
that party receiving award was reasonably
in need.

7. Divorce <3>227(1)
Factors of reasonableness of attorn*
fees in divorce actions include necessity
number of hours dedicated, reasonablene
of rate charged in light of difficulty of cai
and result accomplished, and rates coi
monly charged for divorce actions in tl
community.
8. Divorce <3=>224
Pleadings, discovery, former husband
obstreperous behavior, time devoted to pr
trial matters and actual trial time reflect*
apparent reasonableness of former wife
request for attorney fees in divorce actio
9. Divorce e=*226
Evidence of former wife's need for a
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfol<
ed during entire trial, so special proceedin
specifically concerned with determining he
need was not necessary.
10. Costs <s=*260(5)
Former husband's frivolous appeal an
his apparent harassment of former wii
through repeated civil actions against he
warranted award of costs and attorne
fees on appeal. Court of Appeals Rul
33(a).
11. Costs <3=>260(1)
Sanctions for frivolous appeals shoul
only be applied in egregious cases, les
there be improper chilling of right to a{
peal erroneous trial court decisions, bu
sanctions should be imposed when appeal i
obviously without any merit and has beei
taken with no reasonable likelihood of pre
vailing and results in delayed implements
tion of judgment of lower court, increase
costs of litigation and dissipation of tim
and resources. Court of Appeals Rule
33(a), 40(a).
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumba
to, Gallegos & Sciumbato, Salt Lake City
for plaintiff and appellant.
John Spencer Snow, Snow & Halliday
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respon
dent.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
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OPINION
VRFF, Judge:
aintiff/appellant Guido and defendrespondent Vincenza Porco were died on July 14, 1977, after a twenty-sevear marriage. The trial court ordered
tiff to pay defendant $200 alimony per
bh and distributed the parties' properimtiff has unsuccessfully attempted to
mate or modify alimony payments
times between January 1980 and the
r of this action on February 29, 1984.1
tas previously refused to pay alimony,
h has resulted in several judgments
garnishment proceedings being taken
ist him. By his present motion, he
3 to terminate alimony, to secure the
•n of certain personal property, and to
rer attorney fees. Defendant filed a
m in response to plaintiffs motion
ing alimony arrearages, attorney fees,
an order restraining plaintiff from hang her by continually bringing modifin actions.
July 31, 1985, the trial court denied
tiffs motion and ordered him to pay
idant's attorney fees. Plaintiff con; that the trial court abused its discreby (1) finding no material change of
mstances and, thereby, refusing to
mate alimony; (2) failing to award
tiff certain items of personal property;
3) awarding $1,500 in attorney fees to
idant.
Plaintiff did not appeal the original
ce decree. To modify the decree now,
tiff must show "a substantial change
•cumstances occurring since the entry
e decree and not contemplated in the
>e itself." Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d
710 (Utah 1985). See also Jeppson v.
son, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984);
stiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d
aintiff instituted modification actions m
nary 1980, May 1980, October 1981, and
e 1982.
le original divorce decree was entered on
' 14, 1977
aintiff was originally awarded two vehicles,
tmper, several guns, various hand tools and

592, 594 (Utah 1983). The trial court found
there was no material change of circumstances. To overturn this finding, plaintiff
must show that the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or that the trial
court abused its discretion or misapplied
the law, or that the trial court's award
works such a manifest injustice as to show
clearly an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill,
718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986). However,
the trial court is afforded considerable discretion, and its actions are cloaked with a
presumption of validity. Id.; see also
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-16 (Utah
1986); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670
(Utah Ct.App.1987).

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
[2] The record amply supports the trial
court's finding that there has been no material change in the parties , circumstances.
Although plaintiffs and defendant's incomes have increased, their expenses have
also increased proportionately, resulting in
no substantial change in their relative financial positions. Defendant still requires
the $200 alimony award to maintain as
nearly as possible her previous standard of
living and to prevent her from becoming a
public charge. See English v. English, 565
P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). We affirm the
trial court on this issue.

II
PERSONAL PROPERTY
[3] Ten years after entry of the original
divorce decree,2 plaintiff requests that this
Court redistribute certain items of personal
property.3 Plaintiff has failed to show any
substantive change of circumstance concerning the distribution of property and
"personal possessions and affects [sic] as his
sole and separate property now in his possession " Defendant was awarded "all of the furnishings and effects, including the fixtures and
appliances and other personal property in the
home of the parties not awarded to the plaintiff."
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"[i]n the absence of such a showing, the
decree shall not be modified and the matters previously litigated and incorporated
therein cannot be collaterally attacked in
face of the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, [the] attempt to challenge the equity of the original decree cannot be tolerated/' Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580
P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) (footnote omitted). See also Foulger v. Foulger, 626
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).
[4] Plaintiff further alleges that the trial court's failure to award him other personal property in defendant's possession,
which he originally purchased, has resulted
in a serious inequity requiring reversal of
the original property distribution. However, this is not a changed circumstance, so
any inequity should have been resolved at
the original trial or by appeal of that decision.
[5] Plaintiff also seeks to have defendant held in contempt of court for failing to
return to him a radial arm saw. He speciously argues that it can be operated with
one hand, and, therefore, under the terms
of the original decree, is his property as a
"hand tool." Obviously, a radial arm saw
is not a hand tool. This argument merely
epitomizes the frivolous nature of this appeal, and warrants no further comment.
We thus affirm the trial court's refusal to
redistribute the personal property.
Ill
ATTORNEY FEES
[6,7] Plaintiff contends that attorney
fees should not have been awarded to defendant because there was insufficient evidence of defendant's need. In divorce actions, an award of attorney fees must be
supported by evidence that the amount
awarded was reasonable and that the party
receiving the award was reasonably in
need. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419
(Utah 1986). "Relevant factors of reasonableness include 'the necessity of the num4. In any case, the award might be sustainable
on an alternate ground, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56 (1987), which authorizes fees
to be awarded "to a prevailing party if the court

ber of hours dedicated, the reasonablenes
of the rate charged in light of the difficult
of the case and the result accomplishec
and the rates commonly charged for d
vorce actions in the community/ " Beats 1
Beats, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) (quo
ing Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-8
(Utah 1980)); see also Talley v. Talley, 73
P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
[8] Defendant's attorney submitted
well-documented
affidavit
requestin
$4,130.70. By comparison, the trial court'
award of $1,500 was minimal. No cross-aj
peal concerning the attorney fee awar
was filed by defendant, and we, according
ly, have no occasion to consider whethe
error was committed in awarding this r<
duced amount. The pleadings, discover]
plaintiff's obstreperous behavior, time d<
voted to pre-trial matters, and actual tru
time all reflect the apparent reasonable
ness of defendant's request, much less th
amount actually awarded.
[9] Evidence of defendant's need for ai
sistance in paying her attorney fees unfok
ed during the entire trial, so a special pr<
ceeding specifically concerned with dete
mination of her need is not necessary. Th
Utah Supreme Court similarly concluded i
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 127(
1279 (Utah 1987), stating: "Because amp]
evidence of [the wife's] financial conditio
was before the court, we reject [the hu
band's] argument that the trial court's fin<
ing of need was unsupported by the e\
dence."
Because the trial court's award wa
based on evidence that the amount awar<
ed was reasonable and defendant was i
need, the trial court did not abuse its di
cretion in awarding attorney fees to d
fendant.4
IV
SANCTIONS FOR
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
In oral argument, defendant's couns
argued for the imposition of sanctions c
plaintiff for bringing a frivolous appea
determines that the action or defense to t]
action was without merit and not brought
asserted in good faith."
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] This Court is distressed both by
rivolous nature of this appeal and by
iff s apparent harassment of defendhrough repeatedly bringing civil acagainst her and, thereby, forcing her
j substantial court costs and attorney
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of Utah
of Appeals provides that "[i]f the
determines that a motion made or an
1 taken under these rules is either
)us or for delay, it shall award just
*es and single or double costs, includasonable attorney fees, to the prevailirty."
find no legal or factual basis for this
I in the record. Instead, it is merely
inuation of plaintiff's efforts to haefendant. This Court has previously
d a frivolous appeal as "one having
sonable legal or factual basis as dein Rule 40(a)."5 O'Brien v. Rush,
2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see
barber v. The Emporium
Partner50 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
We recognize that sanctions for
us appeals should only be applied in
:>us cases, lest there be an improper
\ of the right to appeal erroneous
?ourt decisions. However, sanctions
be imposed when "an appeal is obvivithout any merit and has been takl no reasonable likelihood of prevaild results in delayed implementation
judgment of the lower court; inl costs of litigation; and dissipation
time and resources of the Law
Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day,
2d 234, 239 (Me.1981). Therefore,
rd costs and attorney fees on appeal
ndant.
vme point, plaintiff should underlat his emotional involvement in this
mpletely distorts the factual merits
40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
s states, in pertinent part, that:
signature of an attorney or a party constia certificate that the attorney or the
r has read the motion, brief, or other
r; that to the best of the attorney's or the
r's knowledge, information, and belief,
ed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
tided in fact and is warranted by existing
ar a good faith argument for the extenmodification, or reversal of existing law;

of his arguments That message has previously been delivered five different times by
the trial court. We wish to make it clear to
plaintiff, by imposing this sanction, that
any further efforts on his part to punish
defendant will only result in his increased
expenditure of time, effort and money.
We affirm the trial court's decision and
remand this matter to the trial court for
determination of the full amount of costs
and attorney fees, without reduction, reasonably incurred by defendant on appeal.6
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.

V

S KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

r^SA^A-W

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Anita Cuba WALKER aka Anita Cuba
Lofgreen aka Kelly Walker,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870434-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 7, 1988.
Defendant moved to reinstate criminal
appeal from judgment of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno,
J. The Court of Appeals held that although defense counsel took no actions beyond preliminary steps for initiating appeal, appeal would be reinstated since refusal to reinstate might result in denial of
and that it is not interposed for any improper
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
6. The trial court is authorized to allocate responsibility for payment of defendant's costs
and fees on appeal, in whole or in part, to
plaintiff or to plaintiffs attorney as it deems
appropriate.
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Kathleen THROCKMORTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
cil Dee THROCKMORTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 870400-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
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3. Judgment <S=»644
Doctrine of res judicata applies in divorce actions.
4. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Legal recognition of new category of
property rights after divorce decree has
been entered is not in itself sufficient to
establish substantial change of circumstances justifying reevaluation of prior
property division.

Dec. 19, 1988.

5. Courts <s=>100(l)
Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Woodward, that pension benefits are marirmer wife filed petition to modify tal assets subject to distribution in divorce
• decree, seeking increase in alimony proceeding, has prospective application
from $1 per year to $500 per month, only.
eking share of former husband's rent benefits. The Third District 6. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Salt Lake County, Homer L. Wilkin[., increased alimony to $396 per Woodward, recognizing pension benefits as
, but denied wife's request for one marital assets subject to distribution, did
f husband's retirement benefits, and not constitute substantial change of cirr husband appealed and former wife cumstances which would allow former wife
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bill- to bring action to modify divorce decree
J., held that: (1) decision in Wood- rendered prior to decision in Woodward to
, that pension benefits were marital obtain one-half of former husband's retire5 subject to distribution, was not sub- ment benefits.
ial change of circumstances justifying
7. Divorce <&=>245(2)
tluation of property division; (2) forFormer wife met burden of showing
wife met burden of showing substansubstantial
change of circumstances occurchange of circumstances justifying
ring
since
entry
of divorce decree, and not
fication of alimony provision; and (3)
contemplated
in
decree itself, justifying
tnd was necessary to obtain further
modification
of
alimony
provision, where
ngs from trial court to support amount
former wife no longer received any child
limony award.
support payments since all children had
Affirmed in part; reversed and re- reached majority, and wife had become unided in part.
employed due to serious medical condition.

Divorce <s=>254(2)
Trial court's discretionary power to
hion equitable property division extends
lally to subsequent modifications of eardecree, which actions are entitled to
^sumption of validity.
Divorce <s=»286(3, 5)
Absent showing of clear and prejucial abuse of discretion, Court of Appeals

8. Divorce <3=*240(2)
Trial court must consider three factors
in setting reasonable award of alimony:
financial conditions and needs of receiving
spouse; ability of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him or herself;
and ability of responding spouse to provide
support.
9. Divorce <s=>287
Modification of divorce decree to increase alimony to former wife from $1 per
"oar to $396 per month required remand,
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mer husband's or former wife's monthly
expenses, and record did not indicate
whether former wife was presently receiving any income from other sources or extent and probable duration of former wife's
medical problems which caused her unemployment.
Robert M. McRae, McRae & DeLand,
Vernal, for defendant and appellant.
Nolan J. Olsen, Olsen & Olsen, Midvale,
for plaintiff and respondent.
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Cecil Throckmorton ("Mr.
Throckmorton"), appeals the trial court's
order modifying the parties' divorce decree
increasing the alimony to be paid respondent, Gail Throckmorton ("Mrs. Throckmorton"), from $1 per year to $396 per month
Mrs. Throckmorton cross-appeals, arguing
the trial court erred in denying her request
for one-half of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Throckmortons were married on
May 27, 1955, and had eight children during the course of their twenty-one-year
marriage. All of the children have reached
majority.
The parties were divorced on September
13, 1976.
At the time of the divorce, Mr. Throckmorton was a police officer making $19,040
annually. Mrs. Throckmorton was not employed outside the home.
The divorce decree awarded Mrs. Throckmorton custody of the parties' five minor
children and ordered Mr. Throckmorton to
pay $85 per child per month in child support, for a total of $425 per month. Mr.
Throckmorton was also ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $1 per year. Mrs.
Throckmorton was awarded the family
home, subject to the outstanding mortgage.
When the home was sold in 1983, Mrs.
Throckmorton received the equity of $24,000. Mr. Throckmorton was ordered to

pay approximately $12,000 in marital debts
incurred during the course of the marriage.
The divorce decree ^was silent regarding
Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits.
Mrs. Throckmorton is presently unemployed and suffering frpm numerous medical problems prompting her doctor to recommend open heart surgery. Mr. Throckmorton is retired and receives retirement
benefits of $18,970 annually.
Mrs. Throckmorton filed this petition to
modify the divorce decree on September 26,
1986, seeking an increase in the alimony
award from $1 per year to $500 per month,
and seeking a share of Mr. Throckmorton's
retirement benefits. Mrs. Throckmorton
claims that at the time of the original decree, she was unaware she had any legal
rights in the retirement benefits.
The trial court, by stipulation of counsel,
accepted both proffered evidence and the
sworn testimony of the Throckmortons.
The trial court found a substantial change
of circumstances warranted an increase in
alimony to $396 per month based on Mrs.
Throckmorton's current unemployment,
medical problems, and the fact she current
ly receives no child support.
The trial court further held Mrs. Throckmorton's claim to her former husband's
retirement benefits was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Two issues are presented on appeal.
First, whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Mrs. Throckmorton's
claim to Mr. Throckmorton's retirement
benefits. Second, whether there was a
substantial change of circumstance since
the date of the original decree to justify an
increase in alimony to $396 per month.
Standard of Review
[1,2] Trial courts have considerable discretion to adjust divorcing parties' financial
and property interests. See, e.g., Ruhsam
v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah Ct.
App.1987). The discretionary power to
fashion an equitable property division extends equally to subsequent modifications
of an earlier decree.
McCrary v.
McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979).
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Moreover, the trial court's actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Ruhsam,
742 P.2d at 124. Absent a showing of a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we
will not interfere with an alimony or property award. Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v.
Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
Retirement

Benefits

We first address whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Mrs.
Throckmorton's claim to one-half of her
former husband's retirement benefits. The
trial court "has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders
for the support and maintenance of the
parties, . . . or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1988). Accord Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d
181, 186 (Utah 1981). However, in order to
modify a prior property award, the moving
party must establish a substantial change
of circumstances "which was not within the
original contemplation of the parties or the
court at the time the original decree was
rendered." Thompson v. Thompson, 709
P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). Courts are particularly hesitant to disturb prior property
distributions. See Guffey v. LaChance,
127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct.App.
1980).
In the instant case, the trial court found ^
that Mrs. Throckmorton's claim to one-half
of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
According to the trial court, Mrs. Throckmorton had the opportunity to litigate the
issue of her rights to Mr. Throckmorton's
retirement benefits at the time of the original divorce, and did not do so. Mrs.
Throckmorton, however, contends that although she was aware of the existence of
Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits at
the time of the original divorce, Utah law
did not recognize pension benefits as marital assets subject to distribution. Thus,
she claims that the subsequent recognition
of pension benefits as marital assets by the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah

1982), is a substantial change of circumstances which precludes application of the
doctrine of res judicata. We disagree and
affirm the trial court's refusal to reopen
the issue of the distribution of Mr: Throckmorton's retirement benefits.
[3] The doctrine of res judicata applies
in divorce actions. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen,
703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985). "When
there has been an adjudication, it becomes
res judicata as to those issues which were
either tried and determined, or upon all
issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the
other proceeding." Id. (footnote omitted)
(quoting Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d
1287, 1289 (Utah 1980)). However, the application of res judicata is unique in divorce
actions because of the equitable doctrine
which allows courts to reopen alimony, support, or property distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a substantial
change of circumstances since the matter
was previously considered by the court
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d
360 (Utah 1985).
[4-6] We must determine whether the
subsequent legal recognition of retirement
benefits as marital property subject to distribution in a divorce case is a substantial
change of circumstances, thereby precluding the application of res judicata. Or
more specifically, whether Woodward
should be given retroactive effect.
The Arizona Court of Appeals recently
addressed this issue in Guffey v. LaChance, 127 Ariz. 140, 618 P.2d 634 (Ct.
App.1980), a factually similar case. In
Guffey, the wife sought to modify a sevenand-one-half-year-old divorce decree in order to share in her former husband's military retirement benefits. The divorce decree was silent regarding his pension even
though both parties were aware of the
benefits at the time of the divorce. When
the original decree was entered, the Arizona courts had yet to decide whether unvested pension benefits were community assets. However, at the time of the modification, pension benefits were deemed a property right subject to division in a divorce
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decree. Nonetheless, the court denied the
wife's request to modify, stating, "[tjhere
is a compelling policy interest favoring the
finality of property settlements" and this
policy would be "greatly undermined if the
court were to allow the potential for reexamination of every military divorce prior to
the enactment of the rule." Id. 618 P.2d at
636.
We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find that legal recognition of a
new category of property rights after a
divorce decree has been entered, is not
itself sufficient to establish a substantial
change of circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior property division.
Thus, we hold that the legal principles articulated in Woodward, should only be given prospective application.1
Alimony
We next address whether the award of
$396 per month in alimony to Mrs. Throckmorton was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
"[T]he threshold requirement for relief
[in a petition for modification of a divorce
decree] is a showing of a substantial
change of circumstances occurring since
the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Naylor v.
Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). "A
relative change in the income and expenses
of the parties, if comparatively significant,
can amount to a substantial change in circumstances" justifying a modification of a
prior alimony award. Jeppson v. Jeppson,
684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984).
[7] In the instant case, Mrs. Throckmorton met her burden. She is no longer
receiving any child support payments since
all the children have now reached majority.
She is currently unemployed due to a serious medical condition. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's finding of a substan1. Allowing Mr. Throckmorton to keep his retirement benefits considering the totality of the
original property distribution, does not offend
our sense of justice. Mr. Throckmorton, under
the original decree, was ordered to pay $12,000
in marital debts while Mrs. Throckmorton was
awarded the family home and ultimately re-

tial change of circumstances justifying a
modification of the alimony provision.
[8] The issue then becomes whether the
trial court's award of $396 per month in
alimony was an abuse of discretion. The
purpose of alimony is to "enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during
the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge." Eames v.
Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah CtApp.
1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,
100-01 (Utah 1986)). A trial court must
consider three factors in setting a reasonable award of alimony: 1) the financial
conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for
him or herself; and 3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.
Eames, 735 P.2d at 397.
Moreover, it is reversible error if a trial
court fails to make findings on all material
issues unless the facts in the record are
" 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment'" Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v.
Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
Utah courts have consistently found an
abuse of discretion in setting alimony when
the trial court failed to make findings on
the financial conditions and needs of the
receiving spouse. See, e.g., Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) (remanded since the trial court made no findings
with regard to the receiving spouse's ability to work); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d
123, 126 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (trial court
failed to adequately address the financial
needs of the claimant spouse, making it
necessary for the reviewing court to remand the issue for further findings).
[9] The trial court found and the record
supports that Mrs. Throckmorton is presceived $24,000 equity in that home. This is
especially true since the trial court did increase
the original alimony provision. The award of
alimony appears to be a more appropriate method for dealing with the parties' present circumstances.
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ently unable to produce sufficient income
for herself due to her medical problems,
and that Mr. Throckmorton is able to provide support due to his annual retirement
income of $18,900. The record, however, is
void of any facts as to Mr. Throckmorton's
or Mrs. Throckmorton's monthly expenses
which are relevant both to Mrs. Throckmorton's "need" and Mr. Throckmorton's ability to pay. Neither does the record indicate
whether Mrs. Throckmorton is presently
receiving any income from other sources or
the extent and probable duration of her
medical problems.
Mrs. Throckmorton requested $500 per
month as alimony but was awarded only
$396 per month. Although it is apparent to
this Court that an increased alimony award
is justified, due to the lack of facts or
findings of both Mrs. Throckmorton's need
and Mr. Throckmorton's ability to pay, we
cannot determine if the trial court's award
was an abuse of discretion. Thus, we vacate the alimony award and remand for
appropriate findings on all the Eames
factors.
In summary, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the issue of the distribution of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. However, we do find that the trial
court abused its discretion in setting the
amount of alimony at $396 per month without making a determination as to Mrs.
Throckmorton's need and Mr. Throckmorton's ability to pay. The judgment of the
trial court is affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part to redetermine the
appropriate amount of alimony to be
awarded to Mrs. Throckmorton.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ULTRASYSTEMS
WESTERN
CONSTRUCTORS, INC., and Industrial Indemnity Company, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 870212-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 29, 1988.
Electric cooperative which solicited
bids for construction project sued for forfeiture of lowest bidder's bid bond, due to
lowest bidder's subsequent addition of $75,000 to its bid due to a misunderstanding of
the type of work required on certain items.
The Seventh District Court, Duchesne
County, Richard C. Davidson, J., entered
summary judgment for bidder, and cooperative appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that: (1) cooperative's motion for a new trial after the summary
judgment was entered tolled the time permitted for appeal of the summary judgment; (2) trial court properly denied cooperative's motion for new trial; and (3) cooperative was not entitled to forfeiture of the
bid bond.
Affirmed.
1. New Trial <s=>4
Motion for new trial, following grant
of summary judgment, is procedurally correct. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56, 59, 59(a).
2. Appeal and Error <3=>345(1)
Motion for new trial tolled time permitted for appeal after entry of summary
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56, 59,
59(a, b); Court of Appeals Rule 4(a).
3. New Trial ®= 140(1)
Party against whom summary judgment was entered was not entitled to new
trial despite party's argument that its untimely filed affidavits as well as opponent's
unpublished depositions "clearly establish
the injustice that will be accomplished" if
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Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
No. 18089.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.
The First District Court, Box Elder
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted
divorce with property division, and husband
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded
wife share in that portion of husband's
retirement benefits to which rights accrued
during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to such benefits until
he worked additional 15 years, and (2)
award of such benefits was properly made
in form of deferred distribution based upon
fixed percentage.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and
pension rights is inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject
to equitable division in divorce proceeding.
2. Divorce <s=> 252.3(1, 4)
In fashioning equitable property division in divorce proceeding, court may take
into consideration all pertinent circumstances, encompassing all assets of every nature
possessed by parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived, and including retirement and pension rights;
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d
839.
3. Divorce <e=>252.3(l)
Whether resource is subject to distribution in divorce proceeding does not turn on
whether spouse can presently use or control
it, or on whether resource can be given
present dollar value; essential criterion is
656 P 2d—11

whether right to benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during marriage,
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it
is subject to equitable distribution.
4. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
In divorce proceeding, trial court properly awarded wife one-half share in that
portion of husband's government retirement benefits to which rights accrued during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to any such benefits
until and unless he worked additional 15
years at government job.
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
Where husband's right to retirement
benefits was contingent upon his working
an additional 15 years, trial court properly
awarded wife share in such benefits in form
of deferred distribution based upon fixed
percentage.
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff,
appellant and cross-respondent.
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for defendant, respondent and cross-appellant.
DURHAM, Justice:
The plaintiff husband appeals from that
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce
which awarded to the defendant wife a
portion of his retirement benefits. The
husband argues that the court erred in considering, as a marital asset, that portion of
his pension which would be contributed by
the government at some future date.
The husband has worked as a civilian
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen
years. Under his government pension plan,
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension
fund during that time. If he were to leave
his job now, he would receive only the
amount of his contributions. In order to
receive maximum benefits from the plan,
the husband would have to participate in it
for a total of 30 years. At that time, the
government would match the amount of his
contributions and the husband could elect to
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial
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court stated that, because one-half of the
30-year period occurred during the marriage and because the wife is entitled to
one-half of the amount accrued during that
time, the wife was therefore "granted an
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds
which the [husband] receives on his retirement account, to be paid to [the wife] . . .
as [the husband] receives the proceeds.*'
The husband concedes that the wife is entitled to one-half of the sum he has contributed during the fifteen years of their marriage. However, he claims that she has no
right or interest in the amount to be contributed by the government at the time of
his retirement because that amount is contingent upon his continued government employment.
[1,2] The only authority cited by the
husband for his position is Bennett v. Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that
case, this Court reversed a trial court's division of the husband's retirement benefits
because the government's future contribution to the retirement fund was found to
have "no present value." Id. at 840. However, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308
(1982), we commented that "that holding
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife
urges the adoption of the position taken by
the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to
the extent that such rights derive from
employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63,
126 CaLRptr. at 634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of longstanding which had distinguished pension
rights on the basis of whether the rights
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we
find it unnecessary to consider whether or
1. In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975), the court commented that "the concept
of vesting should probably find no significant
place in the developing law of equitable distribution." Id. at 348, 331 A.2d at 262. The court
refers briefly to the origins of the vested interest as it was associated with the concept of

not the pension rights are "vested or nonvested." l In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the
family, pointing out that the court may
take into consideration all of the pertinent
circumstances. These circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
that this includes any such pension fund or
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent that
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the
ability of the court to consider all of the
parties' assets and circumstances, including
retirement and pension rights, it is expressly overruled.
[3] In the instant case, the husband argues that because he cannot now benefit
from the government's promised contributions to his pension at the time of retirement, the wife should not receive any portion of the benefits which are based on the
government's participation. This argument
fails to recognize that pension or retirement
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the employer. If the rights to those
benefits are acquired during the marriage,
then the court must at least consider those
benefits in making an equitable distribution
of the marital assets. " T h e right to receive monies in the future is unquestionably
. . . an economic resource' subject to equitable distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value." Kikkert v.
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in original) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J.
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that
resource is subject to distribution does not
turn on whether the spouse can presently
use or control it, or on whether the resource
can be given a present dollar value. The
essential criterion is whether a right to the
seisin and also to its use in connection with
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional
guaranties. We agree that this concept of
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject to equitable division in a divorce proceeding.
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in
part during the marriage. To the extent
that the right has so accrued it is subject to
equitable distribution.
[4] In the instant case, the husband
must work for another fifteen years to
qualify for the maximum benefits under
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last
month. Because he must work for a total
of thirty years, his pension benefits, including any contribution by the government,
are as dependent on the first fifteen years
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is entitled to share in that portion of the benefits
to which the rights accrued during the marriage. We hold that the trial court did not
err in making equitable distribution of the
husband's retirement benefits.
[5] We also hold that the method used
to distribute the retirement benefits was a
proper exercise of the court's discretion.
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert,
supra, where it was stated:
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible
to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally
strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible. This goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of the pension
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all
appropriate considerations, including the
length of time the pensioner must survive
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of
other assets leaving all pension benefits
to the employee himself.
On the other hand, where other assets
for equitable distribution are inadequate
or lacking altogether, or where no
present value can be established and the
parties are unable to reach agreement,
resort must be had to a form of deferred
distribution based upon fixed percentages.
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in
the present case present just such a circumstance: other assets available for equitable
distribution are inadequate, and a present
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-

cult if not impossible to ascertain because
the value of the benefits is contingent on
the husband's decision to remain working
for the government. In such a case, "the
trial court could use a method widely employed in other states, whereby the trial
court determines what percentage of the
marital property each spouse is to receive,
and then divides payments from the pension
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979).
The Wisconsin court continued:
Under this approach it is unnecessary to
make any determination as to the value
of the pension f u n d . . . . When the beneficiary spouse then opts to receive payments under the pension plan, the noncovered spouse would be entitled to her
established percentage of those payments . . . . Any risk associated with the
fund . .. would be by this method apportioned equally between the parties. This
method may [sic] particularly appropriate
where the present value of a pension
fund is very difficult or impossible to
assess.
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes
omitted).
The trial court awarded one-half of the
marital property to each of the parties in
the instant case. It is clear that the court
intended the wife to receive one-half of the
retirement benefits which had accrued during the fifteen-year marriage. However, in
its order, the court specified that the wife
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the
retirement plan as they are received by the
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued
during the marriage only if the husband
works for the full thirty years. The order
should be modified to provide for the wife
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued
during the marriage, regardless of the
length of time the husband continues in the
same employment. Whenever the husband
chooses to terminate his government employment, the marital property subject to
distribution is a portion of the retirement
benefits represented by the number of
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.

( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen,
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of Utah.

1. Appeal and Error <§=>430(1)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <^344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment o=> 181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment e=>185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resolved in favor of opposing party on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.

Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross
claims with prejudice except for claim
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city
streets in safe condition was question of
fact for jury, precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.

5. Judgment <3=>180
Summary judgment is appropriate only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1)
City has nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations <s=:>798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe,
visible and working condition.

